Ideals of human excellence and The responsibility of protecting nature

Ideals of human excellence

and The responsibility of protecting nature

Emilio Andres Araya

“These reasons for hesitating to destroy forests and gardens are not only the most obvious ones, but also the most persuasive for practical purposes. But, one wonders, is there nothing more behind our discomfort? Are we concerned solely about the potential use and enjoyment of the forests, etc., for ourselves, later generations, and perhaps animals?” (Hill Jr. P.654)

Humans, not unlike any other species but to a far greater extent, have developed the ability to reflect upon themselves and their environment. Humans have come to value things and create abstract concepts such as love, justice and art. However, despite the capabilities that we humans have acquired throughout our evolution, we still generally behave like savages. For all the mental superiority we have, we still find it very easy to act irrationally and discriminatorily. One of the most obvious cases is how we have brought our planet, our home, to such great level of deterioration. We have slaughtered entire species, we still torture beings daily with little regard to ideals of excellence we value most and we destroy our environment with little regard to the consequences it carries for all those who are dependent on it.

In this essay, I will take a look at the most compelling arguments for the protection of our ecosystem. Thus, I will look into the arguments of intrinsic and instrumental value, potential plant rights and ethics, and aesthetics of nature. Finally, I will try to demonstrate that the establishment of environmental ethics cannot be done independently of human valuation, yet cannot be summarized simply in terms of practical purposes. In addition, I will present the idea that environmental ethics is linked to our acknowledgement of abstract concepts of excellence.

What is value? The Encyclopedia of Ethics defines “Value” as “a thing or a property that is itself worth having, getting or doing, or that it possesses some property or properties that make it so.” (p.1745) Although there are diverging point of views, we can add to this that there is a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Here, we can take intrinsic value as meaning something that has value in its own right, as something being valuable simply because of the way it is. This would be opposed to instrumental value which would be defined as something being valued as means to an end. Some have referred to “Good”, “Happiness”, “Beauty” and “Life” to be instances of having intrinsic value. We could also claim that nature not only has value for humans and animals but, even independently of the consequences that destroying the environment poses to those dependent of it, is valuable in itself. Thus, we could present the argument in defence of the environment as nature having intrinsic value. In his essay, Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments, Thomas E. Hill mentions that in theory, the last remaining tree in the whole universe, existing without any trace of any sentient beings could be intrinsically valuable. In referring to the idea developed by G.E. Moore, that “our duty is to maximize intrinsic value”, he extends that example and suggests that “we have reason not to destroy natural environments independently of how they affect human beings and animals”. (Hill p.656) But, is there value in nature? Or is there value in nature, independently of the presence of a living being, a valuator? Alan Carter already wrote in his essay Hume and Nature, in reference to Hume’s moral philosophy: “it appears that moral ‘properties’, such as virtue, and aesthetics ‘properties’, such as beauty, ‘are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind’...And this suggests that we ‘project’ moral and aesthetic ‘properties’ onto objects.” (Carter p.665) We live in a world of facts, where according to situations that favour us we come to establish certain things as being good or bad. Hume seems to indicate that it is also according to emotions invoked by the external world that we come to define certain things as being “beautiful” or “ugly”. Yet, there is no indication that moral or aesthetic properties can be found in nature, independently of a being that could actually be the “valuator”. But this only takes the projectivist theory of value into account. Realists would argue on the other side that value is present in nature, hidden away in its depth, and that it is up to us to discover it. Nonetheless, it doesn’t seem like the debate can be solved any time soon. For someone who defends the projectivist approach, it will therefore be hard to attribute intrinsic value to nature, or for any matter, defend the idea of intrinsic value in general for the problems that arise from it. At most, the only value that we can apparently find in nature is the instrumental value. Thus, nature has value to us humans and other living beings because it is essential to our survival. To claim that humans shouldn’t deliberately destroy, abuse and exploit Earth on the grounds that the ecosystem possesses intrinsic value is open to great debate. In the end, even Hill is forced to point out the various problems of the argument. First, there is great disagreement as to whether we can say that values are objective facts or properties that we can find in nature and it seems therefore that “values and value-judgements are either purely subjective or merely conventional”. (Becker p.1746) Moreover, value judgements tend to differ from person to person and even more among different cultures. What can be seen as valuable for some, will definitely not be thought of as being valuable for others. This lack of universality seems to indicate that the intuitional account of the theory does not represent the best argument in favour of protecting the environment.

Then, if we take the instrumental value of nature as being the most plausible, one of the most obvious arguments for the protection of our environment is a practical one. Destroying nature directly harms us and other animals and it is therefore in our interest to preserve it. When we exploit and destroy the earth, just as vandalising a library violates public property, we are violating global property that does not merely belong to human beings. Tens of thousands of different kinds of creatures live in the Rain Forest and nothing can be said to prove that our needs should have priority over theirs. But even if we don’t think that the simple welfare of animals other than humans is a strong enough argument to preserve the environment, it will be less arguable to say that animals are essential to our survival and that it is in our interest to make sure that all of them do not disappear as a result of the destruction of our environment. We are also greatly dependent of the survival of trees, flowers and plants. Yet, for some, this might not prove to be a convincing enough argument as there are those who will claim that since the planet only has value for those who can enjoy its resources, it is in our best interest to use up as much of it as we can.

While it seems that there is little that could prevent us from selfishly exploiting all of natures resources for our own immediate enjoyment, we could claim against this line of thought that there is still nonetheless the fact that the way we treat nature will affect our children, and that we have some sort of obligation to live up to. What follows then is the argument of our duty to future generations. Alan Carter wrote that: “The stability and integrity of an ecosystem is essential for the well-being of the sentient beings dependent upon it. And if their well-being matters morally, so does the stability and integrity of the ecosystems they inhabit”. (Carter p.669) Although I take this quote from Carter out of its context in which he was trying to defend animal rights, it is still easy to see how it can be just as valid when we think of our duty to future generations. Thus, when we keep in mind what Carter has just said, it seems obvious that we have some sort of responsibility in making sure that the planet we inhabit should be left in a sufficiently good condition for the well-being of our children and possibly also for future generations. That is unless we assume that the interests of future sentient beings, or simply humans, are worth less than those who are alive in the present. Yet, there are some that will claim that since that we are not in a situation of “reciprocal relationship” (Routledge p.819) our duty does not extend to future, unborn humans, especially when we consider that, at one point, we could all simply decide not to reproduce. Therefore, when we talk about preserving the environment so that future generations can also enjoy the benefits of a healthy normal life and that we let the Earth be destroyed it seems we would be doing them wrong. However, the objection says that since those people do not exist, we seemingly cannot say that they are being harmed. Moreover, if they are born in conditions that still make life worth living, even if it is by just barely, it would seem there would be no moral objection since coming into existence in such conditions would be better off for them than simply not existing. The problem with that line of thought is that it rests too much on ideas of “distance”. We see a similar way of thinking when we favour dumping our dangerously toxic electronic waste far away in China instead of burying them here in neighbouring cities. Yet, there is obviously something wrong with that; all the more that it is an illegal practice. Moreover, when we appeal to the future generation argument in defence and preservation of our environment, we need not think as far ahead as the generations that will be affected 50 or 100 years from now. Our current way of treating the environment will have a strong impact in the quality of life of the hundred of thousands of babies that are born every day.

While defending non human animals welfare, when we claim that they have certain rights because they have the capability to feel pleasure and pain (sentient beings in other words), the argument in their defence is a strong one. The case has also been brought up as to whether plants have interests and rights, just the same as humans and animals (pardon me if some of the readers are offended by the idea of suggesting that animals share some sense of equality to humans, but for now, I will take it as presupposed). In his essay, Hill Jr. briefly goes over the argument. He puts forth that, as far as science can tell us, plants don’t seem to suffer or possess likes and dislikes. “The notion that the forests should be preserved to avoid hurting the trees or because they have a right to life is not part of a widely shared moral consciousness, and for good reason.” (Hill Jr. p.655) As it has been discussed many times already in the case of animal ethics, it is hard to defend the interests and rights of plants when it can’t be established that they experience suffering or are conscious of their situation and consequently determine that they have moral interests.

So far, despite sound arguments, it seems that there is very little reason to prevent humans, the ruling species of the world, to dispose of Earth as they see fit. After all, unlike animals, Earth as a whole, or if we narrow it down, plants and trees, seems to lack sentience. And if surprisingly it could be the case that we simply have not discovered they do in fact possess that capability; they do not have the means to communicate and express their discomfort when their existence is being threatened. Moreover, it seems like the ones that stand to lose from the destruction of the planet are those same ones that enjoy what is produced from such destruction. Obviously, the great majority of humans tend to disregard the well being of other animals in destroying Earth and any right to life they might have. As a matter of fact, there are even some who disregard the well-being of other humans who are affected by Earth’s destruction. So for those who are concerned by the destruction of our “home”, it seems that we have few arguments to which we could appeal in defence for the protection of the environment. We must then ask ourselves: Is there nothing more behind our discomfort in destroying the planet? We might find the answer to this ethical question in looking at our world through the eyes of aesthetics. It has been claimed that Earth shouldn’t be destroyed because, for all its beauty that has taken millenniums to be achieved through atmospheric and geological transformations, it is a true work of art.

Although it can generally be agreed that there is great beauty in nature, that nature can be seen as a subject of aesthetic appreciation comparable to a work of art has been, on the other hand, subject to much debate. Against such a comparison some have invoked the argument that the paradigm in the aesthetic appreciation is the appreciation of a design. As Carlson explains the argument: “Paradigmatic art appreciation must be at least appreciation of a thing as something designed and therefore as something which is the creation of a designer”. (Carlson p.206) Thus, if we exclude the possibility of God as a designer and that nature is God’s creation, the argument entails that the appreciation of nature cannot be aesthetic or, put more bluntly, that “Nature cannot be an object of aesthetic appreciation”. (Carlson p.221) If we take a moment to go back to the definition of “aesthetics” as meaning “perception by the means of the senses” (Routledgep.59) and take a second to remember the beauty of a sunset over the pacific ocean or the Iguaçu waterfalls or the amazing display of borealis lights, it is obvious that there is something not quite accurate about the argument. Others have claimed that the appropriate way to appreciate art is through the idea of disinterestedness, in which we look at art objectively, isolating it from other properties that would mistakenly attributed to it. If we take this account of aesthetically viewing art as the most adequate, we would be faced with the problem that when we stand and look at nature, we are hardly in a position of being able to distance ourselves from outside interference. If anything, looking at nature aesthetically encompasses us, involves us. Therefore, while those arguments seem to say that nature cannot be appreciated in the same terms as a work of art, it does not prove that nature is unsuitable for aesthetic appreciation, rather that a new mode of aesthetic appreciation is needed for nature. For the purpose of this essay we simply need to establish that nature does indeed qualify for aesthetic appreciation and does not oblige us to look much more in depth at those other possible paradigm for modes of appreciating nature. Suffice to say that “order appreciation” when looked through the eyes of natural sciences and the idea of the “sublime” have been invoked as particular modes of aesthetic appreciation of nature. There is however a similar way to view art and nature, brought forth most notably by Noel Carroll, that of being moved by nature as a form of “emotional arousal”. Carroll defends himself from presenting an argument stemming from a “residue of religious feeling” or “mysticism” since according to him: “to be moved by nature is to respond to the features of natural expanses – such as scale and texture – with the appropriate emotions.” (Carroll p.265) Moreover, Carroll mentions that to appreciate the beauty of nature, one does not automatically revert to Carlson’s “natural environmental model of nature appreciation”. We might not fully know of the long process it takes to create stalagmites or the difference between a fish and a mammal to enjoy the sight of a whale and clown fish. Thus, if we can agree that emotional arousal is as legitimate a way of viewing art and nature, we are totally justified in comparing nature as a work of art, not by looking at its aesthetic categories, but by the emotion it might invoke in us when contemplating it. But, how far can we go with this observation when trying to establish a solid theory of environmental ethics? The answer lies not in nature, as a subject deserving rights for an ethical treatment, for as we have seen, all indications show that nature, plants and trees lack sentience. The answer lies in the “eyes” of humans themselves, or put more clearly, the reason why the environment should deserve some sort of ethical treatment rests on the set of abstract values that humans have chosen as pillars of their society.

Humans have come to valorise different sets of abstracts ideas. As a mere example, we put value in money, which is essentially some print on both sides of a piece of paper. Paper! We value paper. We work for paper. Some have killed for paper. Of course, the introduction of “money” has freed us from the hassle of trying to trade a goat for some wine. But still, we give such great value to a simple piece of paper for what it represents: the hard work, the sacrifice, the ingeniosity we put in earning that money. Fair enough. What about Art? Though it has been difficult to come to a consensus about what constitutes “art” or even more a “master piece”, society teaches us to distinguish what deserves aesthetic appreciation. Some things can more easily be labelled as a “masterpiece” (Beethoven’s symphony, Homer’s triad, for example) for some, while others can be more subject to debate. Still, we can appreciate a piece of sculpted rock, a canvass tainted with paint, countless pieces of paper attached together and smeared with ink and random sounds produced from the hitting of cords or other things, etc. It seems that no other living being has attained the level of enjoyment in attributing a certain value to common objects as human beings do.

Thus, we distinguish our species by attributing value to ordinary objects and creating abstract ideas. Yet, some of our actions do not reflect one single bit the level of intelligence that our species has attained over hundred of thousands of years. Thus, when we dig the earth knowing full well that the direct repercussions of those actions will be ... we are saying that as humans, we make a mockery of our own set of ideals and values. If we are to claim that we are above other species in being more than comparable animals we must assume our stance at the top of the pedestal and prove that we are deserving of our self-glorification. Conceptualising ideas of “justice”, “goodness”, “beauty” and “love” entails a commitment to harmony and balance. Only brutes would mention such profound and metaphysical abstractions yet, disregard them without honouring the role that such words have had in shaping the ideas of “freedom” and “democracy”. We are at a crossroad where we must reflect upon the existence of our species and put our kind under the magnifying glass. To whom must we prove ourselves as being worthy of our so claimed superiority as civilised beings? To ourselves and ourselves only, driven by our quest for “truth”, “reason” and “justice”. And if we fail the test, it is our entire civilisation, ideals and values that will have proven to be a farce and be deserving of eradication by the next domination craved predator. As the only being endowed with the power of awareness of his position in this universe, it is surprising that we still act as simple minded mammals, not to say true parasites, and not try to preserve the beauty that surrounds us, the diversity that is unique to our planet and the countless lives that are dependent of our governing role. To have been able to idealise and valorise such abstract concepts entails no less that we have the role of guardians of our planet. The acknowledgement of those values entails that we have a responsibility to live up to those conceptions.

If we are to claim that there is nothing wrong in simply destroying what is left of nature, tearing down forests, destroying corals or eradicating a species, then how can we really claim that there is something wrong with burning down the Louvre, blowing up a hospital full of patients, or witnessing a genocide. Achieving the conceptualisation of “justice”, “goodness”, “beauty” and “love”, drives our species to move towards excellence and justifies our claim to “freedom” and “democracy”, which are instances of seeking “harmony” and “balance”. However, we cannot demonstrate double-standards and show favouritism or “speciesm” for every time we destroy something that has taken thousands of years to merit aesthetic appreciation or murder living, sentient beings or cause the suffering of entire species, we are essentially claiming that we do not believe in those ideals and values that distinguish us from other beings and that we are not worthy of calling ourselves “civilised”. The way we are still carrying on with exploitation, destruction and abuse thus leads us to two conclusions. Either we have not yet fully understood the significance of those abstract concepts which while it would demonstrate that we are in some instances somewhat more intelligent than other inhabitants of this planet, would also show that we are not superior by a lot and do not yet deserve to appeal to such values to favour the development of our kind, either we are fully aware of the privilege that our species possesses and yet choose to ignore the responsibility attached to such power and rather manifest the attitudes that brutes and tyrants would and in the end, claim that lies, injustice and exploitation rightly belong in our society. In either case, it demonstrates that we let our actions strongly be guided by primitive concepts that belong to the code of the “Law of the Fittest”. In claiming that humans deserve basic rights and treatments that other living beings do not, we reflect ideas of “discrimination”, “domination” and “oppression” that cannot exist so blatantly in a civilisation that takes noble values as the basis of the foundation of societies of the 20^th century.

But how do such ideas, especially “Justice” and “Beauty”, apply to non-humans? If we look at the concept of “beauty” and “art” first, we will be faced with the problem of having someone say something such as: “the beauty of a forest might be less than that of cutting down the trees and using them to create something even more beautiful in my eyes”. As we have seen earlier, though nature does not fall precisely in the same category as “art appreciation”, it is nonetheless deserving of “aesthetic appreciation”, especially when we take into consideration the thousands of years it might have taken to come about such beauty. Then, what would prevent someone from cutting down an entire forest to create something more beautiful would be the same reasons that would prevent another from taking apart the Mona Lisa for the same purpose if that person owned that work of art. It is easy to see how precious mountains, forests, lakes, glaciers and ecosystems are when we consider the period of time it has taken to achieve such beauty and balance. We would have to be rather short-sighted and selfish to deliberately destroy what has taken so long to achieve such complexity. And the same reasoning could also be extended to encompass our entire planet and not merely parts of it. It is through a process that has taken millions of years that has gathered all the necessary conditions to create and sustain an environment favourable to life. Thus, the responsibility of conception of the value of “beauty” isn’t an argument for more beauty, rather an argument for “harmony” and “balance”. It says nothing of being wrong in using a forest to build something more useful or pleasant, but it says that what is being used and how it is used must be in accord with how it will affect the rest of the environment.

To say that in conceptualising “justice” we must not merely apply it to humans in order to effectively live up to the idea that it represents, seems controversial. Would this say that someone would not have the right to smash a coffee maker or stump a potato in order to portrait the true meaning of “justice”? Our idea of “justice” would obviously not impose on us a responsibility to such narrow levels. But it does oblige us to take into consideration our superior position over other species and hold us responsible for the amount of power we have in shaping the future of our planet. There is no other species that has the means and the power to destroy or protect Earth like we do. And the conception of “life” the fact that we are conscious of our own finitude opens our eyes to how valuable and fragile our existence is. Every action we make has a huge repercussion on the lives of countless other living beings. And while it would be unrealistic to claim responsibility for every single living being on this planet, what ideals of “justice” and “life” makes us accountable for is against the destruction of the ecosystems that maintain and regulate life in them. If we are going to place such value on human “life”, to truly embody our idea of “justice” we must not make a distinction in whose “life” we value, but effectively value “life” as what defines it.

In conclusion, it is our commitment to our most cherished values that justifies the duty not to act in contradiction with them. As a result, what this means for the environment is that the acknowledgement of abstract concepts of excellence obliges us to protect nature. With “beauty” and “art” we have a responsibility to protect nature because as we have seen we can say that we can find an aesthetic appreciation of nature that is comparable to the aesthetic appreciation of work of arts. With “justice”, “life” and “freedom”, we also have a responsibility to protect nature because it is home to countless fragile ecosystems that regulate the lives of countless of innocent living sentient beings. To protect our environment on the grounds of its intrinsic value, the survival of our species, our responsibility to our children and rather unlikely, for the moment being, the just interest of plants, are all good reasons to push us to do so. However, none are more compelling than the one that looks us in the eyes as an extrapolation of our most noble beliefs. After all, we already place great value in work of arts, not to say that art is practically something sacred for us, among other things for its beauty and for its power to move us. There are extremely strict regulations when a work of art is transported from one museum to another and even during public displays, visitors have to follow rules and proceed with extreme care. The painting never asked to be protected and cared for in such manner, yet, we do protect it and value it. We already manifest attitudes of care, respect and admiration for inanimate objects so how can we claim that nature and all the living beings that inhabit it aren’t worth the same kind of protection if not more? The answer is that we can’t, unless we are ready to claim that throwing our set of values and ideals out the window is something we are ready to accept.

References

Becker, Lawrence C, & Becker, Charlotte B. Encyclopedia of Ethics, (2^nd ed New York: Routledge, 2001)

Berleant, Arnold. The Aesthetics of Art and Nature, in Kemal, Salim & Gaskell, Ivan. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts, (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

Carlson, Allen. Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature, in Kemal, Salim & Gaskell, Ivan. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts, (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

Carroll, Noel. On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History, in Kemal, Salim & Gaskell, Ivan. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts, (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

Carter, Alan. Hume and nature, in H. LaFollette, Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, (Blackwell Publishing, 2002)

Craig, Edward. Routledge Encyclppdeia of Philosophy. (London; New York: Routledge, 1998)

Hill, Thomas E. Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments, in H. LaFollette, Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, (Blackwell Publishing, 2002)