Ideals of human excellence and The responsibility of protecting nature

Ideals of human excellence

and The responsibility of protecting nature

Emilio Andres Araya

“These reasons for hesitating to destroy forests and gardens are not only the most obvious ones, but also the most persuasive for practical purposes. But, one wonders, is there nothing more behind our discomfort? Are we concerned solely about the potential use and enjoyment of the forests, etc., for ourselves, later generations, and perhaps animals?” (Hill Jr. P.654)

Humans, not unlike any other species but to a far greater extent, have developed the ability to reflect upon themselves and their environment. Humans have come to value things and create abstract concepts such as love, justice and art. However, despite the capabilities that we humans have acquired throughout our evolution, we still generally behave like savages. For all the mental superiority we have, we still find it very easy to act irrationally and discriminatorily. One of the most obvious cases is how we have brought our planet, our home, to such great level of deterioration. We have slaughtered entire species, we still torture beings daily with little regard to ideals of excellence we value most and we destroy our environment with little regard to the consequences it carries for all those who are dependent on it.

In this essay, I will take a look at the most compelling arguments for the protection of our ecosystem. Thus, I will look into the arguments of intrinsic and instrumental value, potential plant rights and ethics, and aesthetics of nature. Finally, I will try to demonstrate that the establishment of environmental ethics cannot be done independently of human valuation, yet cannot be summarized simply in terms of practical purposes. In addition, I will present the idea that environmental ethics is linked to our acknowledgement of abstract concepts of excellence.

What is value? The Encyclopedia of Ethics defines “Value” as “a thing or a property that is itself worth having, getting or doing, or that it possesses some property or properties that make it so.” (p.1745) Although there are diverging point of views, we can add to this that there is a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Here, we can take intrinsic value as meaning something that has value in its own right, as something being valuable simply because of the way it is. This would be opposed to instrumental value which would be defined as something being valued as means to an end. Some have referred to “Good”, “Happiness”, “Beauty” and “Life” to be instances of having intrinsic value. We could also claim that nature not only has value for humans and animals but, even independently of the consequences that destroying the environment poses to those dependent of it, is valuable in itself. Thus, we could present the argument in defence of the environment as nature having intrinsic value. In his essay, Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments, Thomas E. Hill mentions that in theory, the last remaining tree in the whole universe, existing without any trace of any sentient beings could be intrinsically valuable. In referring to the idea developed by G.E. Moore, that “our duty is to maximize intrinsic value”, he extends that example and suggests that “we have reason not to destroy natural environments independently of how they affect human beings and animals”. (Hill p.656) But, is there value in nature? Or is there value in nature, independently of the presence of a living being, a valuator? Alan Carter already wrote in his essay Hume and Nature, in reference to Hume’s moral philosophy: “it appears that moral ‘properties’, such as virtue, and aesthetics ‘properties’, such as beauty, ‘are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind’...And this suggests that we ‘project’ moral and aesthetic ‘properties’ onto objects.” (Carter p.665) We live in a world of facts, where according to situations that favour us we come to establish certain things as being good or bad. Hume seems to indicate that it is also according to emotions invoked by the external world that we come to define certain things as being “beautiful” or “ugly”. Yet, there is no indication that moral or aesthetic properties can be found in nature, independently of a being that could actually be the “valuator”. But this only takes the projectivist theory of value into account. Realists would argue on the other side that value is present in nature, hidden away in its depth, and that it is up to us to discover it. Nonetheless, it doesn’t seem like the debate can be solved any time soon. For someone who defends the projectivist approach, it will therefore be hard to attribute intrinsic value to nature, or for any matter, defend the idea of intrinsic value in general for the problems that arise from it. At most, the only value that we can apparently find in nature is the instrumental value. Thus, nature has value to us humans and other living beings because it is essential to our survival. To claim that humans shouldn’t deliberately destroy, abuse and exploit Earth on the grounds that the ecosystem possesses intrinsic value is open to great debate. In the end, even Hill is forced to point out the various problems of the argument. First, there is great disagreement as to whether we can say that values are objective facts or properties that we can find in nature and it seems therefore that “values and value-judgements are either purely subjective or merely conventional”. (Becker p.1746) Moreover, value judgements tend to differ from person to person and even more among different cultures. What can be seen as valuable for some, will definitely not be thought of as being valuable for others. This lack of universality seems to indicate that the intuitional account of the theory does not represent the best argument in favour of protecting the environment.

Then, if we take the instrumental value of nature as being the most plausible, one of the most obvious arguments for the protection of our environment is a practical one. Destroying nature directly harms us and other animals and it is therefore in our interest to preserve it. When we exploit and destroy the earth, just as vandalising a library violates public property, we are violating global property that does not merely belong to human beings. Tens of thousands of different kinds of creatures live in the Rain Forest and nothing can be said to prove that our needs should have priority over theirs. But even if we don’t think that the simple welfare of animals other than humans is a strong enough argument to preserve the environment, it will be less arguable to say that animals are essential to our survival and that it is in our interest to make sure that all of them do not disappear as a result of the destruction of our environment. We are also greatly dependent of the survival of trees, flowers and plants. Yet, for some, this might not prove to be a convincing enough argument as there are those who will claim that since the planet only has value for those who can enjoy its resources, it is in our best interest to use up as much of it as we can.

While it seems that there is little that could prevent us from selfishly exploiting all of natures resources for our own immediate enjoyment, we could claim against this line of thought that there is still nonetheless the fact that the way we treat nature will affect our children, and that we have some sort of obligation to live up to. What follows then is the argument of our duty to future generations. Alan Carter wrote that: “The stability and integrity of an ecosystem is essential for the well-being of the sentient beings dependent upon it. And if their well-being matters morally, so does the stability and integrity of the ecosystems they inhabit”. (Carter p.669) Although I take this quote from Carter out of its context in which he was trying to defend animal rights, it is still easy to see how it can be just as valid when we think of our duty to future generations. Thus, when we keep in mind what Carter has just said, it seems obvious that we have some sort of responsibility in making sure that the planet we inhabit should be left in a sufficiently good condition for the well-being of our children and possibly also for future generations. That is unless we assume that the interests of future sentient beings, or simply humans, are worth less than those who are alive in the present. Yet, there are some that will claim that since that we are not in a situation of “reciprocal relationship” (Routledge p.819) our duty does not extend to future, unborn humans, especially when we consider that, at one point, we could all simply decide not to reproduce. Therefore, when we talk about preserving the environment so that future generations can also enjoy the benefits of a healthy normal life and that we let the Earth be destroyed it seems we would be doing them wrong. However, the objection says that since those people do not exist, we seemingly cannot say that they are being harmed. Moreover, if they are born in conditions that still make life worth living, even if it is by just barely, it would seem there would be no moral objection since coming into existence in such conditions would be better off for them than simply not existing. The problem with that line of thought is that it rests too much on ideas of “distance”. We see a similar way of thinking when we favour dumping our dangerously toxic electronic waste far away in China instead of burying them here in neighbouring cities. Yet, there is obviously something wrong with that; all the more that it is an illegal practice. Moreover, when we appeal to the future generation argument in defence and preservation of our environment, we need not think as far ahead as the generations that will be affected 50 or 100 years from now. Our current way of treating the environment will have a strong impact in the quality of life of the hundred of thousands of babies that are born every day.

While defending non human animals welfare, when we claim that they have certain rights because they have the capability to feel pleasure and pain (sentient beings in other words), the argument in their defence is a strong one. The case has also been brought up as to whether plants have interests and rights, just the same as humans and animals (pardon me if some of the readers are offended by the idea of suggesting that animals share some sense of equality to humans, but for now, I will take it as presupposed). In his essay, Hill Jr. briefly goes over the argument. He puts forth that, as far as science can tell us, plants don’t seem to suffer or possess likes and dislikes. “The notion that the forests should be preserved to avoid hurting the trees or because they have a right to life is not part of a widely shared moral consciousness, and for good reason.” (Hill Jr. p.655) As it has been discussed many times already in the case of animal ethics, it is hard to defend the interests and rights of plants when it can’t be established that they experience suffering or are conscious of their situation and consequently determine that they have moral interests.

So far, despite sound arguments, it seems that there is very little reason to prevent humans, the ruling species of the world, to dispose of Earth as they see fit. After all, unlike animals, Earth as a whole, or if we narrow it down, plants and trees, seems to lack sentience. And if surprisingly it could be the case that we simply have not discovered they do in fact possess that capability; they do not have the means to communicate and express their discomfort when their existence is being threatened. Moreover, it seems like the ones that stand to lose from the destruction of the planet are those same ones that enjoy what is produced from such destruction. Obviously, the great majority of humans tend to disregard the well being of other animals in destroying Earth and any right to life they might have. As a matter of fact, there are even some who disregard the well-being of other humans who are affected by Earth’s destruction. So for those who are concerned by the destruction of our “home”, it seems that we have few arguments to which we could appeal in defence for the protection of the environment. We must then ask ourselves: Is there nothing more behind our discomfort in destroying the planet? We might find the answer to this ethical question in looking at our world through the eyes of aesthetics. It has been claimed that Earth shouldn’t be destroyed because, for all its beauty that has taken millenniums to be achieved through atmospheric and geological transformations, it is a true work of art.

Although it can generally be agreed that there is great beauty in nature, that nature can be seen as a subject of aesthetic appreciation comparable to a work of art has been, on the other hand, subject to much debate. Against such a comparison some have invoked the argument that the paradigm in the aesthetic appreciation is the appreciation of a design. As Carlson explains the argument: “Paradigmatic art appreciation must be at least appreciation of a thing as something designed and therefore as something which is the creation of a designer”. (Carlson p.206) Thus, if we exclude the possibility of God as a designer and that nature is God’s creation, the argument entails that the appreciation of nature cannot be aesthetic or, put more bluntly, that “Nature cannot be an object of aesthetic appreciation”. (Carlson p.221) If we take a moment to go back to the definition of “aesthetics” as meaning “perception by the means of the senses” (Routledgep.59) and take a second to remember the beauty of a sunset over the pacific ocean or the Iguaçu waterfalls or the amazing display of borealis lights, it is obvious that there is something not quite accurate about the argument. Others have claimed that the appropriate way to appreciate art is through the idea of disinterestedness, in which we look at art objectively, isolating it from other properties that would mistakenly attributed to it. If we take this account of aesthetically viewing art as the most adequate, we would be faced with the problem that when we stand and look at nature, we are hardly in a position of being able to distance ourselves from outside interference. If anything, looking at nature aesthetically encompasses us, involves us. Therefore, while those arguments seem to say that nature cannot be appreciated in the same terms as a work of art, it does not prove that nature is unsuitable for aesthetic appreciation, rather that a new mode of aesthetic appreciation is needed for nature. For the purpose of this essay we simply need to establish that nature does indeed qualify for aesthetic appreciation and does not oblige us to look much more in depth at those other possible paradigm for modes of appreciating nature. Suffice to say that “order appreciation” when looked through the eyes of natural sciences and the idea of the “sublime” have been invoked as particular modes of aesthetic appreciation of nature. There is however a similar way to view art and nature, brought forth most notably by Noel Carroll, that of being moved by nature as a form of “emotional arousal”. Carroll defends himself from presenting an argument stemming from a “residue of religious feeling” or “mysticism” since according to him: “to be moved by nature is to respond to the features of natural expanses – such as scale and texture – with the appropriate emotions.” (Carroll p.265) Moreover, Carroll mentions that to appreciate the beauty of nature, one does not automatically revert to Carlson’s “natural environmental model of nature appreciation”. We might not fully know of the long process it takes to create stalagmites or the difference between a fish and a mammal to enjoy the sight of a whale and clown fish. Thus, if we can agree that emotional arousal is as legitimate a way of viewing art and nature, we are totally justified in comparing nature as a work of art, not by looking at its aesthetic categories, but by the emotion it might invoke in us when contemplating it. But, how far can we go with this observation when trying to establish a solid theory of environmental ethics? The answer lies not in nature, as a subject deserving rights for an ethical treatment, for as we have seen, all indications show that nature, plants and trees lack sentience. The answer lies in the “eyes” of humans themselves, or put more clearly, the reason why the environment should deserve some sort of ethical treatment rests on the set of abstract values that humans have chosen as pillars of their society.

Humans have come to valorise different sets of abstracts ideas. As a mere example, we put value in money, which is essentially some print on both sides of a piece of paper. Paper! We value paper. We work for paper. Some have killed for paper. Of course, the introduction of “money” has freed us from the hassle of trying to trade a goat for some wine. But still, we give such great value to a simple piece of paper for what it represents: the hard work, the sacrifice, the ingeniosity we put in earning that money. Fair enough. What about Art? Though it has been difficult to come to a consensus about what constitutes “art” or even more a “master piece”, society teaches us to distinguish what deserves aesthetic appreciation. Some things can more easily be labelled as a “masterpiece” (Beethoven’s symphony, Homer’s triad, for example) for some, while others can be more subject to debate. Still, we can appreciate a piece of sculpted rock, a canvass tainted with paint, countless pieces of paper attached together and smeared with ink and random sounds produced from the hitting of cords or other things, etc. It seems that no other living being has attained the level of enjoyment in attributing a certain value to common objects as human beings do.

Thus, we distinguish our species by attributing value to ordinary objects and creating abstract ideas. Yet, some of our actions do not reflect one single bit the level of intelligence that our species has attained over hundred of thousands of years. Thus, when we dig the earth knowing full well that the direct repercussions of those actions will be ... we are saying that as humans, we make a mockery of our own set of ideals and values. If we are to claim that we are above other species in being more than comparable animals we must assume our stance at the top of the pedestal and prove that we are deserving of our self-glorification. Conceptualising ideas of “justice”, “goodness”, “beauty” and “love” entails a commitment to harmony and balance. Only brutes would mention such profound and metaphysical abstractions yet, disregard them without honouring the role that such words have had in shaping the ideas of “freedom” and “democracy”. We are at a crossroad where we must reflect upon the existence of our species and put our kind under the magnifying glass. To whom must we prove ourselves as being worthy of our so claimed superiority as civilised beings? To ourselves and ourselves only, driven by our quest for “truth”, “reason” and “justice”. And if we fail the test, it is our entire civilisation, ideals and values that will have proven to be a farce and be deserving of eradication by the next domination craved predator. As the only being endowed with the power of awareness of his position in this universe, it is surprising that we still act as simple minded mammals, not to say true parasites, and not try to preserve the beauty that surrounds us, the diversity that is unique to our planet and the countless lives that are dependent of our governing role. To have been able to idealise and valorise such abstract concepts entails no less that we have the role of guardians of our planet. The acknowledgement of those values entails that we have a responsibility to live up to those conceptions.

If we are to claim that there is nothing wrong in simply destroying what is left of nature, tearing down forests, destroying corals or eradicating a species, then how can we really claim that there is something wrong with burning down the Louvre, blowing up a hospital full of patients, or witnessing a genocide. Achieving the conceptualisation of “justice”, “goodness”, “beauty” and “love”, drives our species to move towards excellence and justifies our claim to “freedom” and “democracy”, which are instances of seeking “harmony” and “balance”. However, we cannot demonstrate double-standards and show favouritism or “speciesm” for every time we destroy something that has taken thousands of years to merit aesthetic appreciation or murder living, sentient beings or cause the suffering of entire species, we are essentially claiming that we do not believe in those ideals and values that distinguish us from other beings and that we are not worthy of calling ourselves “civilised”. The way we are still carrying on with exploitation, destruction and abuse thus leads us to two conclusions. Either we have not yet fully understood the significance of those abstract concepts which while it would demonstrate that we are in some instances somewhat more intelligent than other inhabitants of this planet, would also show that we are not superior by a lot and do not yet deserve to appeal to such values to favour the development of our kind, either we are fully aware of the privilege that our species possesses and yet choose to ignore the responsibility attached to such power and rather manifest the attitudes that brutes and tyrants would and in the end, claim that lies, injustice and exploitation rightly belong in our society. In either case, it demonstrates that we let our actions strongly be guided by primitive concepts that belong to the code of the “Law of the Fittest”. In claiming that humans deserve basic rights and treatments that other living beings do not, we reflect ideas of “discrimination”, “domination” and “oppression” that cannot exist so blatantly in a civilisation that takes noble values as the basis of the foundation of societies of the 20^th century.

But how do such ideas, especially “Justice” and “Beauty”, apply to non-humans? If we look at the concept of “beauty” and “art” first, we will be faced with the problem of having someone say something such as: “the beauty of a forest might be less than that of cutting down the trees and using them to create something even more beautiful in my eyes”. As we have seen earlier, though nature does not fall precisely in the same category as “art appreciation”, it is nonetheless deserving of “aesthetic appreciation”, especially when we take into consideration the thousands of years it might have taken to come about such beauty. Then, what would prevent someone from cutting down an entire forest to create something more beautiful would be the same reasons that would prevent another from taking apart the Mona Lisa for the same purpose if that person owned that work of art. It is easy to see how precious mountains, forests, lakes, glaciers and ecosystems are when we consider the period of time it has taken to achieve such beauty and balance. We would have to be rather short-sighted and selfish to deliberately destroy what has taken so long to achieve such complexity. And the same reasoning could also be extended to encompass our entire planet and not merely parts of it. It is through a process that has taken millions of years that has gathered all the necessary conditions to create and sustain an environment favourable to life. Thus, the responsibility of conception of the value of “beauty” isn’t an argument for more beauty, rather an argument for “harmony” and “balance”. It says nothing of being wrong in using a forest to build something more useful or pleasant, but it says that what is being used and how it is used must be in accord with how it will affect the rest of the environment.

To say that in conceptualising “justice” we must not merely apply it to humans in order to effectively live up to the idea that it represents, seems controversial. Would this say that someone would not have the right to smash a coffee maker or stump a potato in order to portrait the true meaning of “justice”? Our idea of “justice” would obviously not impose on us a responsibility to such narrow levels. But it does oblige us to take into consideration our superior position over other species and hold us responsible for the amount of power we have in shaping the future of our planet. There is no other species that has the means and the power to destroy or protect Earth like we do. And the conception of “life” the fact that we are conscious of our own finitude opens our eyes to how valuable and fragile our existence is. Every action we make has a huge repercussion on the lives of countless other living beings. And while it would be unrealistic to claim responsibility for every single living being on this planet, what ideals of “justice” and “life” makes us accountable for is against the destruction of the ecosystems that maintain and regulate life in them. If we are going to place such value on human “life”, to truly embody our idea of “justice” we must not make a distinction in whose “life” we value, but effectively value “life” as what defines it.

In conclusion, it is our commitment to our most cherished values that justifies the duty not to act in contradiction with them. As a result, what this means for the environment is that the acknowledgement of abstract concepts of excellence obliges us to protect nature. With “beauty” and “art” we have a responsibility to protect nature because as we have seen we can say that we can find an aesthetic appreciation of nature that is comparable to the aesthetic appreciation of work of arts. With “justice”, “life” and “freedom”, we also have a responsibility to protect nature because it is home to countless fragile ecosystems that regulate the lives of countless of innocent living sentient beings. To protect our environment on the grounds of its intrinsic value, the survival of our species, our responsibility to our children and rather unlikely, for the moment being, the just interest of plants, are all good reasons to push us to do so. However, none are more compelling than the one that looks us in the eyes as an extrapolation of our most noble beliefs. After all, we already place great value in work of arts, not to say that art is practically something sacred for us, among other things for its beauty and for its power to move us. There are extremely strict regulations when a work of art is transported from one museum to another and even during public displays, visitors have to follow rules and proceed with extreme care. The painting never asked to be protected and cared for in such manner, yet, we do protect it and value it. We already manifest attitudes of care, respect and admiration for inanimate objects so how can we claim that nature and all the living beings that inhabit it aren’t worth the same kind of protection if not more? The answer is that we can’t, unless we are ready to claim that throwing our set of values and ideals out the window is something we are ready to accept.

References

Becker, Lawrence C, & Becker, Charlotte B. Encyclopedia of Ethics, (2^nd ed New York: Routledge, 2001)

Berleant, Arnold. The Aesthetics of Art and Nature, in Kemal, Salim & Gaskell, Ivan. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts, (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

Carlson, Allen. Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature, in Kemal, Salim & Gaskell, Ivan. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts, (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

Carroll, Noel. On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and Natural History, in Kemal, Salim & Gaskell, Ivan. Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts, (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

Carter, Alan. Hume and nature, in H. LaFollette, Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, (Blackwell Publishing, 2002)

Craig, Edward. Routledge Encyclppdeia of Philosophy. (London; New York: Routledge, 1998)

Hill, Thomas E. Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments, in H. LaFollette, Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, (Blackwell Publishing, 2002)

Criticising the redistributive approach, Or The injustice of the G-7 and the limitations of nature by Emilio Andres Araya

Criticising the redistributive approach,

Or The injustice of the G-7 and the limitations of nature

Emilio-Andres Araya

The question of international justice has resurfaced since the beginning of the 1990’s mainly in response to environmental issues, acquisition and distribution of resources and world poverty. It is now more evident that the problems that arise from these are not solely the concern of the corresponding nations, but because of its global impact, an international matter. The theories discussed by Nussbaum, Beitz, Singer and Pogge, for example, all seem to be directed towards human rights and development, redistribution of resources and compensation.[1] However, with some perspective we will realise that none address explicitly the role of the environment in securing the basic minimum for a human life. In trying to solve the major issues related to world poverty, one cannot leave aside environmental issues and duty to future generations.

In a fair and just world, every individual would have a minimum amount of goods and equal access to development. However, reality is not so comforting. I argue that such goals are not feasible in the present condition, under the current consumption rate of the richest countries simply because we do not live in a world of abundant resources, and what might be a preliminary solution to starvation, for example, will put a strain on the ecosystem that will deteriorate everyone's future. Consequently, for there to be any chance not to lay our planet to waste, big consumers of developed nations will have to review their life styles and that can only be achieved by addressing the people of those nations at the community level.

To better understand all that is at stake here, one should consider the main arguments for aiding the poor of other nations. Singer argues that there is no moral difference between helping a child drowning in proximity and helping the starving in another country. He further claims that being among other people that can participate in the rescue does not reduce our responsibility to help that child, or consistently to the starving. Thus, when we are spending money on objects that we do not need for our marginal utility, we are doing wrong to those starving since that money would obviously save lives. Arthur opposes Singer and states that since we have no commitment to help the starving it is not our responsibility to help them. Any help of our part must be seen as an act of charity (or positive rights). Thus, we have rights over our body, our money, our possessions and Arthur defends inaction by appealing to our own rights. Arthur criticises Singer’s principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer p.231) on the grounds that it cannot be applied universally. He argues that a reasonable moral code would not ask to help another if it involves substantial reduction of one’s level of well-being. First, he mentions that in his idea of moral code, Singer does not consider entitlements (rights and just desert) that are also morally important. For example, the right over our body outweighs a duty to help and while donating a kidney might save a life, it is not required and compliance to do so would be considered heroic. However, Singer does not claim that people do not have entitlements as Arthur assumes. Otherwise, he would have simply said that humanitarian organisations should directly take the money from people’s bank account. Instead, Singer argues that people should willingly give to the poor. And that is not a matter of rights over goods, but of ideology.

Pogge believes that we are responsible for the situation of the poor and that we have a duty to help and not merely to give money to an organisation. According to Pogge, there are three grounds for the injustice in the world: “the effect of shared social institutions, the uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources and the effect of a common and violent history.” (Pogge p.199) The first claim attacks institutions. It says that the order shared by the institutions is one influenced by those who are better-off and is imposed to the worst-off. The developed countries, with military and economic superiority are able to maintain the rules that benefit them. This means the lives of the worst-off depend very much on the consumption of the better-off (sex tourism and rising food prices influenced by the demand in biofuels, obvious examples of such injustice). Therefore, the rules of the world economy being shaped by affluent countries according to their interests reproduce poverty. Second, the better-off enjoy advantages from the natural resources while the poor goes uncompensated. While the affluent might pay for those natural resources, too often it is to an elite that give practically nothing to the poor. They might be able to come to own a share of the natural resources, but limited education and employment opportunities will earn them just enough to have the minimum to survive. Third, the situation between the better-off and worst-off can be traced to a common and violent history. Thus social inequalities are not the result of a natural catastrophe, but rather from conquest, colonisation, enslavement, etc. Pogge claims that the rules that have violated the rights of the poor cannot simply be erased centuries later. Even if the two previous approaches were rejected, the third one would still lead to the conclusion that the inequalities of the present have been attained through serious injustice and so that the existing inequalities are still unjust. Thus, Pogge demonstrates that we (the global rich) are in fact causing and maintaining the inequalities of the poor and that we are not respecting our negative duties. He establishes that we have indeed an obligation to help the worst-off. In the end, Pogge’s proposal to eradicate world poverty is in the establishment of the Global Resources Dividend. The GRD would require governments to pay a percentage on resources they use to be given as payment to the poor who are also entitled to a share of the world’s natural resources.

Our role in helping the poor seems clear and so we could provide the food necessary to relieve world hunger, and that up to the foreseeable future, as global food supply indicate that we grow enough food to come to the aid of those most in need.[2] However, there is no indication that world hunger can be overcome through food supply alone. A more sustainable solution would call to invest time and resources to develop the institutions that will see to prevent future starvation, though it would entail at the present time, the sacrifice of a greater number of lives in order to do so. But coming to the aid of the starving is not the only decision we must make. We must also consider that reaching the goals of the political philosophers I have mentioned and save the poor might jeopardise future generation’s well-being, as I explain below.

An equally pressing matter to helping the starving, but that the majority of philosophers fail to address thoroughly in consequence of their global justice theories, is the protection of the environment. In the current state, our consumption of natural resources might serve our enjoyment, but continuing at such rate will surely rob future generations of the minimum for their well-being.[3] According to the WWF’s 2004 Living Planet Report, between 1961 and 2001, our consumption of fossil fuels has increased by almost 700 percent. WWF chief Claude Martin said:

"We are spending nature's capital faster than it can regenerate…We are running up an ecological debt which we won't be able to pay off unless governments restore the balance between our consumption of natural resources and the earth's ability to renew them." [4]

It is not a case of saving nature versus feeding people, for we already have enough food to feed those in need without having to suck the life out of our planet. It is a case of inequality of consumption and how the richest nations misuse their resources. “The G-7 nations hold about one-fifth of the world's five billion persons, and they produce and consume about four-fifths of all goods and services.”[5] In reality, Earth can only be exploited to a certain level before we unbalance the ecosystem (global warming, deforestation, starvation of the ocean, etc.) and it begins to "self-destroy”. And the greatest victims of natural disasters will inevitably be the poor, who are the most vulnerable to climate change. Maintaining G-7 consumption level and raising the third worlds even to a minimum represents a tremendous risk. In fact, it will give the poor nations the necessary means to kick off their development and that cannot be done unless we lower the rate of consumption of natural resources in the rich countries.[6] I will come back to this argument shortly.

Now, some would say that the redistribution of resources is not the best way to deal with the problem of poverty. According to Rawls “The great social evils in poorer societies are likely to be oppressive government and corrupt elites.” (Rawls p.77) And as Beitz then comments “If the great social evils impeding social progress are primarily internal and non-economic, then a principle of international justice would be superfluous.”(Beitz p.279) If such is the case of the nations we seek to help, then what is proposed by Singer and Pogge will not bear fruit and might rather go into creating more inequalities. If we then intended to send resources (money, food, technology) that could be seized by the corrupted, would direct intervention (setting up institutions, hospitals, schools, pipelines and to set up some sort of agriculture) that will promote the well being and the development of poor people be a better solution? However, even for those who are sceptical of a redistributive method and would favour a more direct intervention, we will eventually face the same constraint as I was discussing earlier, i.e. strain on the environment. And so, the farms we will establish and the pipelines that we will build will not help at all if the degradation of productive land or desertification keeps progressing or if more of the water they drink is contaminated. They might eat and drink, but that is in the present. In the short term, they might die from poisoning or they might give birth to sick and deformed children. Moreover, assuming that the minimum has been attained and that the well-being of people now rests on the hands of their own government to develop an economy and trade that will allow them to have opportunities for further development, after then having faced starvation and poverty, they will very likely face exploitation and corruption. The developing countries will then be the means for international corporations to make more profit on cheaper work force where the government will fail to protect its own citizens by running down environmental and labour standards, as well as offering huge tax concessions, getting rid of union rights, minimum wage requirements, safety measures and social insurance.[7] Thus, we cannot simply ignore the situation and entirely relegate the responsibility of maintaining the balance of our fragile ecosystem (or “re-establishing it” would be more accurate) on the developing nations.

Assuming we improve the worst-off’s situation and secure them a minimum for their well-being, what will result from a world where poor nations will then be able to turn their attention to development is that, just as we see in the Kyoto protocol, the now (further) developing nations will not be subjected to the same regulations as the rich countries, though theirs is supposedly a temporary clause. If only 55 industrialised nations that have ratified the protocol are producing 55% of the worlds CO2 emissions, and the other 122 developing nations produce 44.2 %, can we imagine the rise of CO2 emissions if those 122 countries seek to attain the same living standards as the 55 industrialised? If the United States of America, which is the largest per capita emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and Australia, two well developed and powerful countries, have not yet ratified the protocol despite heavy international criticism then our future doesn’t look very bright. And rest assured that those developing nations will not be satisfied with marginal utility if for no other reason that giant corporations, on the constant look out for emerging markets, will fiercely promote the way of life which citizens of rich nations enjoy. We would then be true hypocrites to deny them the comfort that we have been enjoying for so many decades.

To some extent, I approve Peter Singer's view that we should not follow the Western Idea of economy based on consumption. We gain far more money than we need to live a decent life.[8] Moreover, we have for too long left our consumption of natural resources unchecked and it is time we realise that even the smallest of actions will contribute to improving the environment. Leaving the car home and taking public transportation or even the bicycle if distance allows, not leaving the water running for long periods of time, turning off our lights or using more efficient light bulbs, choosing containers made of glass instead of plastic, using a fabric bag instead of plastic bags for shopping, etc. Those are all easy and simple actions that need little effort and nothing more than a breaking of habit. The change needed is in the way of life of consumers of the rich countries. With a few changes to our “wasting habits” we would then have more means to contribute part of our earnings wisely in environmental and humanitarian organisations or even better, to give our surplus as salaries to incite people to go over there and work in the construction of those pipelines and farms. And if as some fear, a decrease of productivity occurs because people might not then feel motivated to work anymore, then so much the better. It might show that we are working more than we really need to. Change the weekly working hours from 50 to 30 and let companies establish themselves in poor countries with the same working regulations so that the poor can benefit from the remaining 20 hours.[9]

Thus, Singer attacks the idea that people feel the need to surround themselves with more commodity than they truly need. Elster refers to “adaptive preference” (how one’s satisfaction is adjusted to the level they know they can aspire to). So the filthy rich that own a mansion, cars, boats and resorts would probably not settle for an apartment in the suburbs and public transportation. Moreover, people’s satisfaction is not only relative to themselves, and in a society of consumption it is relative to the possession of others. One most probably comes to desire what the neighbour possesses. Most examples can be imagined with basic electronic appliances. With the rapid technological development, people in rich countries will therefore never settle for a limit and the standard of living in those countries can only increase while those in poor countries will decrease, has the numbers already show. However, the issue is that if we attack the problem of poverty in poor nations via something like a global dividend or directly help development, because of the ecological consequences that would result from the development of poor nations, or still, if we try to implement Singer’s argument on giving up our “luxurious ways” to help the poor, it will be inevitable that we address the over-consumption of wealthy countries. Thus, at one point the change will have to come from the consumers themselves. Sadly, it is highly unlikely that people will deliberately accept to give up their commodities for a greater cause, mostly because we feel rather disconnected from what happens somewhere so far away. Therefore, what will have to be dealt with is the problem of motivation.

As Dewey highlighted its importance, it seems to me that regarding the problem of consumption in developed countries, the focus must be done at the community level by those who are concerned by international matters and the environment and thus reach to others. There is a lot of information for the one who wants to find out more about such issues and make a conscious decision to play his or her part in helping reduce consumption, one little action at the time. However, there are many others who, for different reasons, might it be for lack of time or interest, peer pressure or simple ignorance, would do well to be reminded how crucial their participation is. One way to reach those people would be by organising local events or consciousness-raising campaigns, not necessarily to collect money, but if for nothing else than to promote awareness on how we could easily make a difference by changing a few of our old habits. Dewey said: “In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse” (Dewey p.211) and that is why it is important to realise that for an awareness campaign to be effective, it has to take place in, and address, neighbourhood communities. Ideally, municipalities would be implicated in the project and provide some funding to help advertise the events that would take place throughout the city, but the help of local volunteers would help establish a greater sense of community by involving people known within it. Running messages on television or the radio, or organising one big event located in only one part of the city would, above all, attract those who are already aware of the situation, but it would fail to reach those who don’t feel concerned about the problem. Organising local events at strategic times, how small it may be, at the local park for example, would make it much more personal and convenient, especially with todays fast pace life style. After a long days work, people might not feel particularly inclined to go check out an event for which they don’t have much interest all the way across town, when they have to go pick up the kids, get home and prepare dinner and attend to whatever other matter they must. A short stroll out of the house to check out what the fuss is about at the corner wouldn’t require a long trip or much time and could prove quite enjoyable. Making people aware of the situation and making them realise that, for starters, small changes to our daily habits can already make a big difference, is the first step in finding the motivation to help the poor and to be involved in rectifying this global crisis.

In conclusion, pondering on theories of redistributive justice and the basis for adequate human development has to be done with environmental issues in mind and in conjunction with promoting awareness on reducing wasteful consumption. In attaining at least the basic minimum for the poor to survive, Pogge’s proposal of the GRD is a more practical and efficient solution in the short term than Singer’s or Arthur’s, but it could be a time bomb for the whole planet. First, whether through the redistribution of resources or direct help in setting up infrastructures, we cannot assume that upon reaching a minimum they will not be able to further develop their countries since Pogge himself stated:

“The goal is not merely to improve the nutrition, medical care, and sanitary conditions of the poor, but also to make it possible that they can themselves effectively defend and realize their basic interests.” (Pogge p.197)

Then we cannot assume that the development of their countries will not escape the corruption of institutions and corporation that will not comply with environmental or labour regulations. Finally, the planet would not be able to support very long the strain of a whole world raising to North American standards of living unless it is done so with revision of appropriate regulations of the most polluting and exploiting corporations already in place, which in reality is too great of a gamble. In the end, something along Singer’s view seems to be the most hopeful for everyone’s well-being, including that of future generations and as he mentioned, we are so wealthy compared to others that we might not need to reach marginal utility in order for the poorest to do so. The point is that people need to realise that they are being told to want more than they truly need by a consumption based economy. But behind the idea lies the problem of motivation for people to want to make the changes necessary for the benefice of all of us who are concerned. While I cannot begin to discuss sociological problems, any change in people’s way of living would ideally be done through education, but that too is afflicted by corruption. With the increasing disappearance of religion in North America, which once used to gather members of a community under one building every weekend and tell them about fraternity and mutual aid, it would seem difficult to rally everyone in a fragmented and individual society. For those of us who feel we are so far away from the extreme poverty we see in third world countries and too short-sighted to notice the ongoing deterioration of the ecosystem, it is crucial that people from their own community present these problems more personally than through mediatisation. It is through the bonds that unite neighbourhood communities that we will create the motivation for ecological and humanitarian change.

References

Arthur, John. ‘Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code’, in H. LaFollette, Ethics in

Practice: An Anthology, (Blackwell Publishing, 2002)

Beitz, Charles. ‘International Liberalism and Distributive Justice’, World Politics 51.2

(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999)

Dewey, John. The Public and its Problems, (New York: Holt, 1927)

Elster, Jon. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1983)

Nussbaum, Martha. ‘Capabilities and Human Rights’, in P. De Greiff and C. Cronin eds.,

Global Justice and Transnational Politics, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002)

Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Polity, 2002)

Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)

Singer, Peter. ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1972,

Vol. 1 No.1

Some links on how to reduce consumption:

Energy: http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/genergy.asp

Bags: http://www.reusablebags.com/action.php?id=3

Gasoline: http://www.dailyfueleconomytip.com/driving-habits/the-top-10-ways-to-reduce-your-gasoline-consumption/

Water: http://www.organiccoupons.org/blog/2008/07/25-painless-ways-you-can-reduce-your-water-consumption/

Paper: http://www.5minutesforgoinggreen.com/94/reduce-paper-consumption/?action=print

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[1] Charles Beitz's intentions for some sort of global governance is to establish distributive justice and basic human rights and he expresses in Cosmopolitan liberalism the insurance that every individual has a global stature not limited by the state. Martha Nussbaum hopes to create an international agreement of the basis of human rights, by shifting the focus on capabilities, Peter Singer, calls for a duty for the wealthy to give considerably to the poor, while Thomas W. Pogge emphasising a resource based method to ensure that the poorest have access to a minimum, tries to prove our responsibility for aiding, but in implementing a resource dividend (GRD) that is not as demanding for consumers.

[2] FAO’s first forecast for world cereal production in 2008 stands at a record 2 164 million tonnes (including rice in milled terms), 2.6 percent up from last year’s crop, which was the previous global high.

...Food consumption of cereals is forecast to reach 1 006 million tonnes, an increase of about 1 percent from 2006/07. http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai465e/ai465e04.htm 2008/08/28

[3] In its regular Living Planet Report, the World Wide Fund for Nature said our footprint now exceeds the world’s ability to regenerate by about 25 per cent. Living Planet Report 2006

http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/96 2008/08/28

[4] http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/1021-02.htm 2008/08/28

[5] And that was data from the World Development Report 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). More recently, according to the World Bank, the 2.3 billion residents of low-income countries accounted for less than 3% of public and private consumption in 2004, while the 1 billion residents of high-income countries consumed more than 80% of the global total.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/envronmt/general/2007/0831consumption.htm 2008/08/28

[6] If developing nations continue to increase their consumption to match industrialized nations, worldwide consumption would increase 75 percent and the list of regions that consume beyond local production would get a lot longer. http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2004/WWFPresitem729.html 2008/08/28

[7] For example, it is no secret of the exploitation of Chinese workers by US factories: The research

report found employees had to work for more than 16 hours a day for an entire month but earned as little as 300 yuan (HK$282) a month.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html 2008/08/28

2004 marked the 20^th year since the tragedy of Bhopal that might have been avoided had the safety measures not been violated: Authorities say at least 15,000 people have died in what has been described as the world's worst industrial accident, although activists put the number at some 33,000. http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/12/02/india.bhopal.mark/ 2008/28/28

[8] And then again, it might just be a matter of adjusting our consumption habits to buying cheaper toilet paper at 1$ instead of the new Cottonel cashmere at 2, 50 $ or not buying 10 different pair of jeans when just one or two would do just fine.

[9] After all, it is not such an alien idea. France introduced the 35 hour week in 1998 and though under the current administration the system will suffer some modifications, the French financial daily Les Echos found that 79% of workers supported the 35-hour week.

http://www.greenleft.org.au/2008/761/39296 2008/08/29